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Abstract:

The number of Business angel networks (BANs) has increased rapidly and they are now widespread across Europe. Policies promoting informal venture capital generally and BANs specifically have gained increased attention. Debate prevails if BANs should be supported with public money. The objective of this paper is to discuss the possible rationale for governments to support BANs.  Related, it is discussed what criteria to apply when evaluating such networks, and what is the timing and time perspectives of policies. Only limited literature exists on this because the BANs in Europe are only a decade old and have primarily been a UK phenomenon.

The story of the Danish BAN (DBAN) is an interesting one in this context. It includes initial considerations to support a BAN, thorough feasibility studies, hesitations to implement it, major investments in the establishment of a BAN, and decisions to pull out in a 7 year time span. In the paper motivations and criteria for decisions in these phases are laid out and general lessons outlined.

The study is based upon interviews with key actors in DBAN; observation studies of the development of DBAN from idea generation, inception through to establishment of working practises. Knowledge on this is facilitated by involvement by the author in the first idea formulations and membership of the Board of DBAN. The study also incorporates an interview-based comparison with a similar national angel network in Wales. 

Results show that applying traditional evaluation criteria for assessing BANs is inexpedient and may render only a partial picture. Additionally, DBAN was squeezed in between political pressures, impatience and lack of understanding of the broader benefits of an angel network and therefore was left to die. An unfortunate timing pushed to the process. A different story is revealed in Wales where more patience and persistence is shown as well as a rapid integration in the investment community. 

Implications of the study are that one-size-fits-all policies cannot be applied in this area. Lack of consistent funding, even in downswings, may erase the position and awareness of BANs in the capital market. BANs may be considered a part of the general small business support infrastructure. The paper is valuable in contributing with an in-depth, observation study of the whole life cycle of a national BAN and it provides a new and broader understanding of how BANs should be evaluated.



Should Government Support Business Angels Networks?  – the tale of Danish Business Angels Network.

1. Introduction


Debate prevails as to whether public support for Business angel networks (BAN) has a rationale. Alternatively they could be ‘banned’ on the ground that the financial markets are functioning efficiently, and there is no need for the public sector to interfere in this market. As the titles of academic papers such as ‘Business Angels: should they fly on their own wings?’ (Aernoudt, 1999),  ‘Should we ban the Bans’ (Goosens and Aernoudt, 2002), and ‘Do business angel networks deliver value to business angels?’ (Knyphausen-Aufsess and Westphal, 2008) indicate, this debate is not only a policy issue, it has also attracted considerable attention in academic debates. The business angels market is characterised by highly asymmetric and also pure lack of information. Business angels networks essentially try to remedy this informational gap.

Policies promoting business angel financing have gained increased attention. One of the reasons for this is the perceived low costs associated with creating jobs through this type of intervention as pointed to by several studies even a decade ago (Aernoudt, 1999, Mason and Harrison, 1999, EBAN, 1998). The potential deficiencies at the market are furthermore argued to be easily remedied through simple means (Aernoudt, 1999). 

In spite hereof opinions differ on whether there is a rationale for public intervention on this market (Brander et al., 2008, Knyphausen-Aufsess and Westphal, 2008, Leleux and Surlemont, 2003). Even if the majority of researchers seem to advocate that business angel activity should be promoted (e.g. Mason, 2007, Sohl, 2007, Murray, 2007) then there is debate about the means, the timing and the extend of a possible role for government. This paper discusses the possible rationale for governments to support business angel networks.  Related, it is discussed what criteria to apply when evaluating such networks. It is further discussed what is the importance of the timing and time perspectives of policies for strengthening BANs.

The story of the Danish business angels network (DBAN) is an interesting one in this context because it includes both initial considerations to support a BAN, thorough feasibility studies, hesitations to implement it, major investments in the establishment of a BAN, and decisions to pull out, all these phases in a 7 year time span. Motivations and criteria for decisions in these phases are laid out and general lessons from this story drawn out.

The study is based upon interviews with key actors in DBAN as well as observation studies with close following of the development phases of DBAN from idea generation, to inception through to establishment of working practises. The study of this development was facilitated by the authors’ involvement in the first idea generations and subsequent membership of the Board of DBAN (also allowing access to all written documentation). Interviews with key persons involved in the DBAN were also performed after the closing down of the network. A comparison with a similar angel network in Wales is instructive in giving perspectives on this story. This comparison is based upon interviews with the managing director in the Welsh national business angel network, Xénon, and also draws upon work by scholars who are collaborating with Xénon and have studied the development of this network. 

The following section 2 points to the main problems, primarily informational deficiencies, at the market. The pros and cons of government involvement in the financing of BANs are displayed in section 3. Section 4 tells the story of DBAN and compares this – in section 5 - to Xénon in Wales. The final section 6 concludes and applies the insights from the studies to the principle considerations on the role of government intervention and the evaluation criteria.


2. The BANs in the capital market

Because of the nature of the market for informal venture capital, with a great deal of activities being of an invisible character, our knowledge on how the market has developed remains limited. Following the increased interest in this type of financing from both academia and policy makers more investments have been registered. However, we do not know exactly how much should be attributed to a real increase of activities and how much is a result of improved statistics and registration of the phenomenon. 

What we do know is that not only has the number of business angels registered increased, there has also been an increase in the number of networks for alleviating the information problems in the market. For example, the European Business Angels Networks, EBAN, an umbrella organisation for business angel networks, have registered 234 BANs in 2007, an increase from 50 in 1999. In particular, the number of BANs increased steadily until 2004 and has since then stabilised as depicted in figure 1. Moreover, these BANs are now widespread across Europe (EBAN, 2007). 




The business angels market may serve as an example of an incomplete market. The players on the market are generally not visible. In a much-cited passage Gaston (1989, p.4) it has even been described as ‘a giant game of hide and seek with everyone blindfolded’. This means that initial screening costs are relatively high and that actors at the market have immense difficulties finding each other. This market has therefore often been mentioned as an example of a market with severe informational deficiencies. In spite of deficiencies of the market business angels financing is generally considered an important element in the total financing supply for small, new firms. 

BANs may potentially be important in increasing transparency of the market. BANs are part of a wider system where important institutions feed the BAN with relevant investment opportunities. This enables the BAN to act as intermediaries in matching demand for capital and competences with supply of this embedded in business angels. The analogy of a marriage office has often been used. The practise reveals that in fulfilling this function, BANs differ in their profile and operation. For example, Lange et.al (2002) list 7 typological dimensions to characterise BANs:
	private vs. Public
	For profit vs. Not for profit
	Early stage focused vs. All stages
	Specialist investors vs. Generalists
	Active screening and support vs. Passive
	Regional or local geographical reach vs. National or pan-national
	Introduction services only vs. a broader range of services offered

The evidence on the practise of BANs moreover suggests that the first dimension mentioned determine several of the other dimensions (Mason, 2006). Thus, it seems as if private and public BANs serve different functions in the market and in fact, may target different segments (Mason and Harrison, 1997). 

The business angel activities may furthermore be described according to their organisation such as Matching networks, facilitators, informal angel groups, formal angel alliances, electronic network, individual angels (Sohl, 2007). Using this typology Sohl (ibid.) recommend some basic features for angel portals. First, they should generally strive to maintain an informal structure, maintain a regional basis, facilitate personal interaction between the parties, and ensure that deals and investors alike exhibit high quality. Stages of investments may also differentiate types of angel portals. ‘Individual angels’, ‘matching networks’ and ‘informal angel groups’ may be appropriate for seed stage investments, whereas the ‘formal angel alliance’ and to some extent ‘matching network’ types may better invest in later stages.  


3. The costs and benefits of government intervention

The problem to be addressed

The traditional discussion on public intervention generally rests on several arguments, the ‘market failure’ argument being the most prominent. This argument claims that in case the market is not able to solve a (allocation-) problem efficiently, perhaps because of lack of information, externalities etc., then there may be a case for government intervention (European Commission, 2003, Murray, 2007). In relation to informal venture capital policies, the objective of policy is to provide access to goods that the market fail to produce, specifically networks and coordination. Policies now increasingly refer to system failures rather than market failure. Such policies to alleviate system failures may address institutions and capabilities related to the interaction between key agents in the system. As such, this perspective is more adequate for modern industrial policies than the market failure perspective and may be particular relevant in relation to BANs. 

The business angels market may be a case of market failure or system failure as mentioned above, and therefore an area for government intervention. Whereas the discussion was previously only concerned with supplying an adequate amount of money, attention is now much more directed towards the informational problems. BANs themselves may, however, face information problems. In addition to finding a sufficient number of investors and entrepreneurs with investment ready proposals to join the network many business angel networks have experienced difficulties in creating awareness of the network and in funding the activities in the network (Sohl, 2007, Mason and Harrison, 1993). 

There are several ways to promote business angel financing, but the primary policy strategy to promote business angels activities has been the establishment of business introduction services (Arnoudt, 1999, 2005). The knowledge on the performance of such services is still limited although a few evaluations have been made (e.g., Mason and Sackett for BVCA, 1996, Manigart and Arnoudt, 2007, Harrison and Mason (eds.) (1996)). Therefore, usually British experiences have been referred to when discussing the socio-economic return of BANs. In Britain evaluations have shown that BANs contribute substantially to job creation and that the public costs per job are low (EBAN, 1998). It should be stressed that our data are not good on this issue, mainly due to the fact that the bulk of BANs have not yet existed long enough to be subject to evaluation. However, even if we had more adequate data we would face severe problems in estimating the total costs and benefits for society of BANs. 

The promotion of informal venture capital should, however, be weighted against the costs involved in interfering at the market.
Costs of policy intervention

Three main types of potential costs could be mentioned in relation to the government participation in financing business angel activity, especially BANs. The first is the mere financial aspect of this involvement. Government must not only consider whether there is a positive socio-economic return from investing in BANs, but also consider if the amount invested would have paid off better somewhere else. In other words, there are opportunity costs involved in the decision on where to invest government money. 

The second consideration is that in a longer time perspective a heavy involvement of government may render an expectation in the market that this is taken care of by the government. In this sense the government involvement may be a lock-in, which is difficult to get out of. Related, it may be hypothesized that the public intervention is crowding-out private investments in these introduction services (Leleux and Surmont, 2003). However, evidence both from the UK (Mason and Harrison, 1997) and from a wider array of European cases (Lange et al., 2002, Leleux and Surmont, 2003) suggests that private and publicly supported angel networks target different segments of the market. Moreover, there is evidence showing that the few existing purely privately financed BANs serve a different function than those where government money is involved. The deals done through privately financed BANs are larger and at a later stage of development than those going through government sponsored networks (European Commission, 2002, Mason and Harrison, 1997)​[1]​. Therefore, crowding-out of private initiatives is unlikely.​[2]​

Critique of BANs from business angels was summarised by Harrison, Dibben and Mason (1997) as being lack of screening of entrepreneurs and their business proposals as well as lack of quality and coherence in the information about the investment opportunities. Also the matchmaking process was often criticised. However, these critiques may apply to both private and public BANs and is mainly critique of the specific practise of BANs rather than how they should operate in principle. Although no solid evidence is available on this effect it is possible that the business angels signing up for BANs are those who are not able to attract enough quality deal flow by themselves through their network and referrals. 

Benefits of policy intervention

The benefits of business angel financing in general and government promoting this with financing BANs are not confined to the direct advantages, also indirect effects must be taken into account. The latter is treated in more depth as it is not that often considered.

The direct benefits include that experiences from the few government initiatives within this area that have been running for some time suggest that the cost per job created, easily compares with other initiatives (Mason and Harrison, 1999, 2005, Harrison and Mason, 1996). In addition, government programmes generally are often subject to dead weight - that is support of activities that would have been undertaken regardless of the support. However, research on this show that initiatives supporting the functioning of the informal venture capital market are unlikely to suffer from dead-weight effects (Mason and Harrison, 1996, 1999). Displacement effects, the redirection of activity from equivalent or otherwise economically beneficial activities, are also likely to be low (ibid.). Often informal investments come from a pool of capital, which was otherwise used for consumption or placed passively in e.g. bonds. 

The evidence so far also indicates that business introduction services could not be commercially viable without public support, if they are to operate on the scale necessary to be effective. This is concluded both in international studies (Mason and Harrison, 1995, 1996, 1997) and a Danish feasibility study prior to the decision on establishing DBAN (Deloitte & Touche, 2000). EBAN (2007) find that only 6,4% of European BANs are for-profit networks. They also find that public co-financing of BANs in Europe amounts to 84% (EBAN, 2002). Also in the UK the majority of investments are made through non-profit networks (Mason and Harrison, 1997).  It is therefore widely recognized that it is an important task for government to help BANs get going. Whether there are possibilities for government to withdraw from financing BANs at a later stage is an open question. Arnoudt et al. (2007) find that contrary to expectations almost none of the networks in Europe have become self-supporting.

The indirect effects of BANs include that these may act as ‘hubs’ in the market (Christensen, 2008) but also that they render what in evaluation studies has recently been denoted ‘behavioural additionality’ (Georghiou et al., 2004, OECD. 2006). Whereas the majority of evaluation studies and policy makers mainly have focused upon directly measureable effects, such as input and output additionality and substitution effects, there is now a growing recognition that policy schemes may also impact the behaviour and strategies of actors in a long term perspective, longer than the duration of the scheme. Following these arguments the criteria for evaluating effects of e.g. BANs should be extended beyond for example just the number of introductions/matches and investments made. 

One type of such an indirect effect is that business angel financing is often a gateway to other types of financing - bank financing, government support programmes and other equity investments (Christensen, 2008). This has been pointed out in early papers (Mason and Harrison (1995, Mason and Sackett, 1996). Results to support these findings were also found in a Danish survey (Christensen, 1999): the majority of respondents see the participation of private investors as having either great or decisive importance for the willingness of other investors to participate. It was found that this applies especially to banks. In this way the impact of business angel financing in general and BANs in particular may reach beyond its’ immediate target and instruments. The examples show that it is indeed not only confined to behavioural additionality related to business angels and their target investee but also to other actors at the market; they generally become more aware of other actors at the market and get better equipped for acting as intermediaries.

A second effect is that the hands-on character of the investment often provides the firm with an upgrading of competencies especially with respect to management skills in addition to the immediate value adding contribution in the single investment. This is again, an effect that extends beyond the pure inputs, rather impact on behaviour in a longer time perspective. On the investor side there may also be such learning effects. To the extent that angel networks bring investors together there are possibilities for mutual learning and syndication. Some BANs (including DBAN) even have training programmes for business angels (European Commission, 2002, Gullander and Napier, 2003, Sohl, 2007).

As shown in Danish surveys (Christensen, 1998, Deloitte & Touche, 2000), the players in this market often see intervention positively. The way top-down establishments of BANs is received by market participants is likely to be a function of the maturity of the market. In countries where the venture capital market is generally less developed and an equity culture has not been established, business angels and other actors perceive the government intervention as an important and necessary kick-off. Bottom-up establishment of BANs is more likely to happen in a market where activity is high, although even in this setting a lack of coordinating organisation may hinder the upsurge of BANs. 

A societal task for a BAN is to provide information that facilitates a more efficient screening of projects looking for capital rather than only optimizing the number of investments made. The exclusion of bad projects is an important benefit of a BAN. Even when the contact does not lead to a deal the experience of e.g. presenting a business plan to potential investors may be beneficial in other circumstances, because many entrepreneurs look for other financing sources if rejected from business angels, this time often with an improved business plan.  

Several studies have proven that there is a low level of awareness among entrepreneurs about the supply of equity financing in many countries, in particular with respect to formal and informal venture capital (Arnoudt et al., 2007). A BAN may raise awareness on this type of financing both among entrepreneurs and their advisors. This benefit is extremely important, a long-term effect, and very difficult to capture with any precision in evaluations. 

An additional function has to do with a co-ordinating function. Many BANs fulfil this task by drawing standards for legal documents; implement code of conduct standards, provide guiding in questions such as tax problems etc., thus minimising aggregate transaction costs in society. A BAN may in this manner be important as building up of competencies with both entrepreneurs and business angels even if not providing direct training. 

Finally, it is from a social point of view an essential function of a BAN that it constantly works with developing the BAN concept as such. This may be in the form of benchmarking different matchmaking methods (physical, virtual, Internet, events etc.), systematic learning from experience from abroad, and different ways of marketing the network. An important tool for this learning process is establishing a monitoring system of adequate indicators on the performance of the BAN. 

Incorporating the above, broad functions of a BAN such initiatives may be assessed differently than pure measurable effects. Whereas an ordinary evaluation would probably mainly count the number of investments made through the network, it is in a broader perspective equally important to count in e.g. also that a number of projects that have been screened but not financed; the increased awareness; the learning effects and the reduced transaction costs in society.


4. The rise and fall of DBAN

The environment

Generally, the Danish capital market has a relatively well-developed and well-functioning debt market whereas the equity market is less developed. Equity capital sources such as venture capital have been few and in short supply. Up until the beginning of the 1990s there was very little attention on business angels as a possible financing source for SMEs in Denmark.  Also the institutional venture capital industry in Denmark is relatively young. Most of the venture capital companies were established in 1983-85, and the industry developed rapidly in the second half of the 1980s after a take-off period.  However, only a few years later the industry dramatically declined to a negligible size. In 1990, a record low for the investments by Danish venture capital firms was set, the number of venture capital companies declined from a high of 26 in the end of the 1980s to 12, of which only 4-5 were actively investing, and both new corporate investments and capital supply to the venture capital industry decreased. A large accumulated financial loss since the start of the industry additionally caused many venture capital firms to follow a cautious, risk-averse investment strategy with the majority of investments occurring in the later stages of a firm’s development (Christensen, 2003). 

Idea, feasibility, design and funding

In this setting there was great concern about a possible ‘credit crunch’ and severe difficulties for many firms to finance their development. These difficulties were visible both on equity markets and loan markets. The government actively searched for alternatives to the constrained capital markets and were receptive to ideas of mobilising capital sources that were rarely used. Business angels were hardly debated before but were then recognised as a potential supplement to traditional capital sources and the restricted institutional venture capital market, even if also business angels were affected by the negative investment climate. A pilot study and angel network was initiated in late 1991, which was limited in scope and budget, but nevertheless managed to collect a list of 106 business angels, primarily through regional meetings and press announcements. However, these angels were not screened and only a few investments were made. In 1992 government support was terminated and the network ceased to exist in other ways than as a list of persons who occasionally were send investment proposals. 

Christensen (1992) then pointed out that substantial amounts of capital could perhaps be mobilised if informational deficiencies at the market could be alleviated and contact channels made available. This statement was repeated in 1998 (Christensen, 1998), this time with new empirical evidence supporting the claim and a thorough discussion on possible policy measures and different design options of a BAN. Following this proposal a feasibility study was commissioned and done by Deloitte & Touche (2000) on behalf of the Ministry of Industry. It was concluded in this study that substantial resources, financial and competences, could be mobilised through business angels but that there is a lack of information channels. Potential users viewed establishment of a BAN positively, and it was found that such a BAN could not be established without the intervention of government. Subsequently, in 2000, the government fund, The Danish Growth Fund, was supported financially with EURO 700.000 for a 2-year period to establish Danish Business Angel Network (DBAN). The Growth Fund contributed with office facilities to host the two person staff and secretariat.

Establishment

Since its establishment DBAN accomplished to mobilise 200 business angels some (one third) of these were also members of 5 regional business angel networks. 70 of these business angels were relatively active and committed themselves to invest. Even more regional and sectoral oriented BANs were set up or planned. These included a BioBan focused upon biotechnology, creative industries BAN, Agro BAN, a London-residents BAN, and an IT BAN. Only the BioBan got going. Likewise the expansion of regional BANs ended as plans only. 

Angels in the network were screened and they signed an agreement on good code of conduct. Many financial resources – more than 200.000 Euro - were put into establishing an electronic, web-based matchmaking site and juridical tools such as standard contracts were developed. Investments were made, although on a low level, and matchmaking events were held. Two major national conferences and several seminars were arranged contributing substantially to raising awareness about business angels as a financing option, and also showing business angels the benefits of a central, coordinating entity. 150 articles were published in newspapers and road shows to key actors took place regularly. It is beyond doubt that the general awareness of business angels in Denmark was much higher as a result of these activities. This goes for the awareness among business angels that they are not alone, that a possibility exists to increase competences, use standardised contracts and other centralised facilities, including defending interests in the political system. Likewise the awareness among entrepreneurs about business angel financing as an option certainly increased. This in turn may alleviate some of the informational asymmetries and –deficiencies in the market. 

Growth and getting embedded in the financial community

Parallel to the establishment and operation of DBAN the debate on potentials of business angel financing was intense in the business press. This was to a large extent spurred by DBAN in corporation with selected business angels who told their stories in the press. The institutional venture capital literally boomed in Denmark in the late 1990s and even in the beginning of the 20th century in spite of the burst of the dot com bubble (Christensen, 2003). Growth rates were the highest in Europe, according to EVCA. 

The ground was now cleared for a take-off of the activities of business angels in Denmark. The DBAN had established itself as a node for business angels with regional branches initiated and supported by DBAN. The Advisory Board was renewed to include business angels only, and a handful of key angels were very active in promoting the networks and in helping out the management of DBAN to navigate in the financial community, present the initiative and establish contacts. A competence building day was also initiated. The co-location with The Danish Growth Fund should ideally render synergies and also signal that the business angels market is an important part of the total venture market. The BAN was exposed in the magazines and other material from The Growth Fund. However, the full benefits of this co-location were never reaped. 

Evaluation, financing, re-organisation and decline​[3]​

The establishment of DBAN took up substantial financial resources. The costs of the feasibility study came close to 100.000 Euro, the grant for 2000-2001 270.000 Euro and for 2002 400.000. In the 2003-2005 period a grant was given from the Ministry of Science of 550.000 Euro. In total the investments amounted to Euro 1.320.000. Over the years there was an on-going discussion on the funding from government. The Ministry was reluctant to support the DBAN activities on a long term basis, because they feared being caught into a situation with permanent subsidy. 

Also, there seemed to be a lack of knowledge within the government with respect to how BANs work and what could be expected in a short-term period. The status reports and other communications were focused upon easily measurable parameters like the number of investments made, number of introductions, and number of networks created. Several of what has been termed indirect effects above, such as the awareness raising and behavioural changes, is a long-term effort, which is heavily underestimated. Government was reluctant to see supporting DBAN as an investment in the SME infrastructure and financial support was on more than one occasion close to being terminated. For example, by end of November 2002 there was no acceptance of the grant for financing activities from January 1st. The staff did not know if they were without job one month ahead. The DBAN staff, DBAN Advisory Board, and selected, active angels argued that BANs need time to take off, and that many of the benefits are not ‘hard’ facts, rather community building, awareness raising, mobilising angels etc. EBAN (1998) estimates that a for-profit BAN may be able to break-even after 8 years. Until then a government co-financing is necessary​[4]​. 

In spring 2004 it was decided to re-organise the network. It then became a part of the Danish Venture Capital Association (DVCA), who in return received the remainder of the ministry grant for DBAN of 200.000 Euro in 2004 and 110.000 in 2005. The official reason for including DBAN in DVCA was to facilitate synergy between business angels and institutional venture capital. In reality, the angels were not very eager to join the DVCA umbrella. During the IT-investment period the institutional venture capitalists negotiated deals on warrants that left business angels with small ownership stakes, and this, among other things, contributed to a divide between angels and institutional venture capital. 

The BAN activities under the auspices of DVCA since 2005 have been limited. On the DVCA web page there are links to web pages of 3 of the regional networks that still have some activity. The other regional networks and sector specific networks are no longer active. There are no real community-building activities or even any of the other typical BAN activities. In practise, the DBAN has ceased to exist with the withdrawal of the government involvement. Regional networks do continue some of the activities that were initiated under the DBAN period, but the coordinating, national function is no longer there. It was closed down before the potentials of DBAN have had a chance to unfold. It was investigated if there was any chance to continue DBAN on a private, for-profit basis. However, after one month of making and testing a business plan for such a continuation of the network it was concluded that it had no chance.  

Mason and Harrison (1993) mention three pre-conditions for the successful establishment and growth of a BAN: a high visibility and credibility through on-going marketing is needed to build a critical mass of investors and investment opportunities; it must be well resourced, and thirdly, a hands-on and pro-active approach is needed. Most of these preconditions were met in DBAN. Nevertheless, when looking back, not evaluating formally, it is fair to conclude that the initiative has not been a success, e.g. in terms of the number of investments made by the help of DBAN. Neither has the web-based match-making been able to facilitate much information dissemination compared to the resources spent. On the other hand, a comprehensive evaluation has to take into account a broader set of criteria as shown in section 3. There was no understanding of this, even if it was argued persistently what are the broader effects of BAN. Also it was argued in the Advisory Board of DBAN from the very first meeting that future discussions (fights) on funding could be foreseen and therefore it would be wise to set up a systematic registration of activities and effects.

5. Business angel networks in Wales  - a comparison

The economic environment in Wales is characterised by a number of industries such as coal and steel being transformed and pressured by global competition. Wales perform worse than the rest of the UK on many performance indicators, both aggregate indicators like unemployment and income and business related indicators like the number of start-ups and ‘gazelles’ (Mariott and Davies, 2006). The Global Entrepreneurship Monitoring survey for 2002-2006 found that informal investment activity in Wales is a little below the UK average with 1.2-1.4% of the adult population claiming to be involved in such activity compared to an UK average of 1.5%. A feasibility study from Cardiff University in 1996 nevertheless concluded that there was a rationale for a BAN in Wales, and that the number of angels that could be the target for a BAN would be 150-200 making around 15-20 deals a year (ibid.). Following this study Xénos was established in 1997 as a national BAN underwritten by the Welsh government. It is organised with a central office and manager and four regional managers. Xénos is organised with regional branches because of the geography of Wales.

The development of the venture capital market in Wales has proceeded largely as elsewhere in Europe. In Wales there used to be a tendency to smaller deals, but that seem to have levelled out. The market has followed the general cycle, and at the formal market also the trend towards larger deals in larger, more mature companies has been in Wales. Concerning the development of the business angel market in Wales there are not quite similar trends as in the formal venture capital market. In particular the trend towards going up in stage is not that clear. Instead there is now a trend towards more MBO/MBI also in angel investments. Another trend is the growing succession market, which angels find attractive, and which Xénos help find buyers (=angels) for. Finally, there is an increased tendency to syndicate.

Because Wales is a rather compact society where networks are strong, and the know-who factor important and widely used, there are strong links between different actors such as Finance Wales, Xénos, banks, other public sector organisations, and government grants.  This has also affected the time horizon before Xénos was established on the market and could operate fully functionally. Xénos was integrated and recognised quickly, partly because of the people involved in the network from the start were already involved in the investment community. 

Since the establishment of the network a total of 288 angels have registered with the network. The number of angels is now (end-december 2007) 120. In the decade of existence Xénos has facilitated 105 deals, mobilising around 14 £millon. Angels are recruited through referrals, and a show-ball effect through the already registered investors. The general awareness of angels/BAN is helping recruitment. In addition, the central and regional managers keep track of who sold their business profitable. Typically, after 6 months the former business owner tend to get tired of golf and travel but are not all ready to become independent angels. The network is instrumental in helping such people organise their interests in getting involved with businesses again.  

A register is kept with angels’ investment preferences and resources. There is currently no success fee but it may be implemented in the near future. It costs 300.000 £ annually to run the network, most of it salaries. Investment bulletins and presentation days are used, but the primary match is done manually because the managers in the Xénos have good knowledge of the angels and businesses, they have a sense of who would be interested. 

The performance measures used are the number of deals, the amounts of money mediated, jobs (although this is difficult to measure and it is only registered as an effect from the initial investment, the subsequent growth is not captured in the registrations). However, the evaluation criteria are not confined to these parameters, also soft factors such as the number of opportunities presented, company presentations and other networking activities counts.

Mariott and Davies (2006) concludes in their study of the network that Xénos has been successful in mediating supply and demand for business angel capital, and has been important in meeting the points of criticism often raised against BANs. Important in this has been the fact that the people running it had an understanding for and practical background from private sector business. 

6. Conclusions

The tale of DBAN shows that the network in practise closed down in spite of relatively large financial investments in the establishment and initial operation of the BAN. This can be attributed in part to some internal decisions and how the network was operated, such as the decision on huge investments in the electronic match-making portal, which in practise did not pay back these investments, but the by far most important factors were external. First, the state of the general market did leave the venture capital market somewhat hesitant and had an impact on both the extent of mobilising angels and how the angels and the BAN could be positioned in the capital market. Specifically, the IT-burst in 2000 imposed substantial losses on many business angels, who then left the market and complementarities with the formal venture capital market was severely hit. Secondly, there was a pressure from funding partners to show results in an unrealistic short time horizon, results that were confined to be measured on very narrow criteria. The understanding of the broader societal function of a BAN was not present not alone the willingness to see the BAN as a part of the business support infrastructure, rather than one in a range of other policy schemes. 

It is therefore found that applying traditional, narrow criteria for evaluation of business angel networks is inexpedient and may render only a partial picture. The story of the rise and fall of DBAN shows that the initiative was squeezed in between political pressures, impatience and lack of understanding of the broader benefits of an angel network and therefore was left to die. An unfortunate timing pushed to the process. A different story is revealed in Wales where persistence, patience and integration in the investment community are keywords.  For governments the lesson is that flexibility and patience is absolutely necessary. Moreover, the general economic conditions are influencing the operation of BANs, and governments must understand this.

This paper contributed with a broader view on what criteria to apply when evaluating such networks. This discussion may be extended to other areas than BANs. It was further discussed that the time perspectives of policies for strengthening BANs are important, and that networks go through development phases that should be taken into account when designing the support. As such the paper contributes with an in-depth, observation study of the whole life cycle of a national BAN, and it provides a new and broader understanding of how BANs should be evaluated.

The policy lessons and implications are several and have already been discussed above. For the management of BAN one implication is that it may be fruitful to systematically register any activity that may contribute to the indirect effects of their activities. For policy evaluation researchers the need to take into account these indirect effects, including behavioural additionality, is obvious. 

Future research may explore and be more specific in how such indirect effects may be measured. 
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^1	  European Commission, 2002, refer to that publicly supported BANs in the UK have an average investment of 149000 EURO, whereas the average angel investment through commercial networks is substantially higher, 285000 EURO. Likewise, the share of start-up/early stage investments were 70% and 40% respectively.
^2	   The crowding out effect from government intervention was found in the Canadian market (Brander et al., 2008), however this study focused on the formal venture capital market.
^3	  Some of the information in this section is from internal minutes, status reports to and from the Ministry and interviews.
^4	  European Commission, 2002 support this opinion by stating that “in particular in the awareness raising stage a public support element is mostly necessary, especially because this is a general requirement for the angel market to take off.”(p.30).
